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blaster
thecouch -at- overpressure.com
yes, an homage to jonah
pittspilot
pittspilot -at- overpressure.com
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May 30, 2004 |
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Memorial Day
First, a little history of Memorial Day.
Second, I think the Gettysburg Address sums up the meaning of Memorial Day better than anything else.
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth, upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that "all men are created equal"
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of it, as a final resting place for those who died here, that the nation might live. This we may, in all propriety do. But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate -- we can not consecrate -- we can not hallow, this ground -- The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have hallowed it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here; while it can never forget what they did here.
It is rather for us, the living, we here be dedicated to the great task remaining before us -- that, from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they here, gave the last full measure of devotion -- that we here highly resolve these dead shall not have died in vain; that the nation, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people by the people for the people, shall not perish from the earth.
posted by blaster at 11:31 PM | Comments (1)
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May 26, 2004 |
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Sarin news - lab says pre-Gulf War
Well, now we know - the ISG, or the military, at least, is being forthcoming with this information:
At the Pentagon, Brig. Gen. David Rodriguez (search), deputy director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the 155-millimeter artillery shell was made by the Iraqis before the 1991 Gulf War. The source of the bomb is still under investigation.
While its apparent age would mean it can't be regarded as evidence of recent Iraqi chemical weapons production, some analysts worry the shell may be part of a larger stockpile of Iraqi chemical weapons now in the hands of insurgents, but no more have turned up.
This seems pretty definitive. The story also says "Because the shell was not fired from a gun but was detonated as a bomb, officials say the initial explosion on May 15 dispersed the precursor chemicals and apparently mixed them in only small amounts." This does not clearly say that the shell was never fired from a gun, just that it was not employed that way in this incident. But it seems pretty evident that this was not a dud scavenged off of a test firing range. And that means that Iraq's accounting of precisely 170 of these rounds made and destroyed was incorrect. Chances are there are more of these. How many is impossible to guess, but the chances of there being exactly one extra round that Iraq hid from the inspectors seems pretty close to nil.
Good reporting from Fox on this story, too. They also have:
Iraq's first field-test of a binary-type shell containing sarin was in 1988, U.S. defense officials have noted. Saddam's government only disclosed that it was testing and producing sarin after Iraqi weapons chief Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, defected in 1995. But Iraq never declared any sarin or shells filled with sarin remained.
posted by blaster at 10:05 PM | Comments (10)
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Advice to the terrorists
They say that you guys are talking up a storm lately, and you are inordinately proud of what you got done in Spain. I know we are all infidels, but you might want to rethink these so-called plans of yours. First of all, we aren't Spain. Don't look at the Cannes film festival and think, man, those guys are soft. Don't replay Bob Kerrey's grandstanding videos off of the C-SPAN website and think that we are too internally divided to survive. Don't watch the Madonna concert and think, "those people are too sick to live."
You guys made the same mistake before. We'll just kill a bunch of Americans and they will be stunned, and the rest of the Muslim world will rise up with us to take over the world. It didn't happen that way. You hurt us, I'll grant you that, but you really, really pissed us off. You made Ted Kennedy sing God Bless America. You made an NFL player get off the field so he could kick your ass. You may have killed him, but I'm just betting he gave way more than he got. You made people want to bomb places that they didn't even know existed just to get back at you guys. And we did. And then we started breaking up that whole fascist thing going on in your excremental part of the world, just to make sure you won't do it again.
Yet you persist. Gonna hit us big this summer. You want 4 million of us, I hear, just to make things even. Not sure "even" for what. But I'm telling you right now, it is an extremely bad idea. Do it - or just try it - and I can't even begin to guess at what would be coming your way. You have no idea what we can do. You think you'll scare us, maybe we'll hold a big commission again and wonder what we did wrong. Maybe. But first we'll kick the living dogshit out of you and anybody who likes you or talks like you or maybe just says you aren't so bad. We'll forget about how bad we felt about the naked guys in prison. And so will you.
Maybe in your neighborhood, cutting the head off of a defenseless man makes you cool. Yeah, I know Mr. Zarqawi, just like your idol, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed. He cut off Daniel Pearl's head for the camera, and that made him cool, too. He pulled off 9/11, double cool. Yeah, well get a gander at what cool gets you:

That's pretty freaking glorious, isn't it?
You may have a pretty fine gig over there in Iraq, skulking from one old septic tank to another in the garden spot of Fallujah, and you're seeing how your folks over there are getting shot to shit when they take on the US Marines head on. You might think, man, I'll go get me some of those guys without the body armor and guns.
Well, that was with us holding back. Bring something big over here again. I think you'll find that our balance has shifted on what is acceptable to us. And a whole lot of us have guns, here. We're tired of this crap already - been tired. But give us a big ugly reason, and we'll take the lazy way out. Just kill you all, let Allah sort it out. You think WMD is cool? We invented them. You ever nuked anybody? We have. That's what happens when our patience just runs out on fanatics who want to kill us.
We can hold investigative hearings after that. All summer long, if you want, and play it all on TV so kids home from school won't get to see Mr. Knozit. We can all get a bellyful of the political circus. But you'll miss it, being highly dead and all.
As gratifying as it might be to know your cobalt rich ashes are blowing in the wind, I'd just as soon that we not go there. I mean, it is such an ugly business. And we might feel a little guilty for doing it, afterward, too.
You won't get anything out of it - it won't matter who is President here when you are dead. And we'll still be here. Maybe a messier place than we were, but still here just the same.
You've got a decent deal right now - you can kill all the Muslims you want, and every once in a while get an American, too, and pocket a little cash from the Saudis. You might even just wear out our will if you don't make too much of a nuisance of yourself. Hell, stop being a terrorist, you could even start living instead of hiding. But that's probably too much to ask.
So take a deep breath. Reevaluate. Because we'll survive it, our country and our culture, even if you kill millions of us. You - and your country and culture - won't. There won't even be an argument about it until after you are long dead.
posted by blaster at 07:40 PM | Comments (27)
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May 25, 2004 |
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More downplay
I remember hearing this story briefly, but it was during bloody April, so it was pretty much drowned out by the noise. Basically, the ISG was going to inspect or raid a suspected chemical factory, and the building blew up. Two people died. I hadn't heard this story's particular angle, which is that it was a trap. Still, the part that intrigues me is this quote from BG Kimmitt:
In Baghdad, Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt did not say what sort of chemical munitions were believed to be produced at the site.
"Chemical munitions could mean any number of things," including smoke grenades, he said.
Hmm. We've drifted from quote to paraphrase - did he really say that? Let's go to the tape:
GEN. KIMMITT: As I've said, there's information that suggests these individuals were involved in the production of chemical munitions. That could be any number of chemical munitions. It could be smoke. It could be anything. But it apparently had enough credibility to it, that information, that we sent coalition forces in to do the inspection.
Yep, an actual paraphrase. So next question - did he actually say that?!?! This deserves an "Oh, come on!" I need a rolling eyes emoticon or something. I feel a little moonbatty - "We went to war over smoke grenades?!??!"
I think that BG Kimmitt provides some very decently straightforward briefings about military operations. But that "could be smoke" is just insulting. Just say you can't say instead of that.
posted by blaster at 08:17 PM | Comments (1)
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Straight from the comments
I don't have anything new on the sarin shell. The story seems to have stalled, unless the ISG comes out with new announcements or some enterprising reporter follows up on a story that clearly has more to be told, I don't know where it goes from here. But in my Recap and Reveal post below, I come to the conclusion that information about Iraqi WMD are being downplayed, and wrote "I can imagine circumstances where it would be more important to conceal this kind of information than to reveal it."
This led to the question, in the comments, well, what would those circumstances be? I ended up writing a lot in the comment, and I thought I should bring it up front.
Well, one reason that it may be downplayed is that there is nothing to it. Occam's razor. I think Ritter has a point about the ISG - that they should tell what they know about this round. If it's a dud from a known program, say so. If not, say so.
Certainly there could be some tactical reason to keep that one round secret - the bad guy who put it together may know what pallet he pulled it from, now he knows he has a bunch of chem rounds. And he knows that the way he had it rigged doesn't work, so he can try other ways, or maybe it now becomes more valuable to sell them to other people who can make it work.
Except of course the ISG announced the existence and function of the round. So the tactical explanation doesn't hold (though it appears that the round was discovered about a week prior to the announcement).
Maybe that was a preemptive announcement from a leak, but I think that the announcement was made as it was for a purpose. I think Duelfer has a different agenda from Kay, and by releasing the specific info he did, raising the questions that I did. (I am not so conceited to think that it was a coded message direct to me - I think that it should have been obvious to Blix and Kay and that crew that this was not a leftover from the Iran-Iraq war.) But then it just stops. So that could be wrong.
Anon4201 - of the posited possibilities, the one that is closest to what I think is #4. [this is #4: Playing sneaky diplomacy in order to blackmail the UN and/or other countries with wmd/unscam evidence.] I don't know about blackmail, but maybe. The only reason I can think for withholding WMD info (besides the moonbat "because it all has US markings on it" that keeping the info secret only encourages) is if the information has more value as actionable intel than as a validation of one of our causes for war.
The rollup of Libya's WMD programs and the Abdul Khan ring in Pakistan happened in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. They came about with major pieces of intelligence that occurred at the same time - coincidence?
I find it odd that the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market has been publicly tied to every bad guy regime in the Middle East except Iraq - seems that Hussein would be the most obvious customer. It would be rather inconvenient if one of our big allies in the GWOT also helped arm Saddam with nuclear weapons.
Where it all falls down is that now it is a year after the fact - I don't think that the intelligence can be all that actionable anymore. From a political perspective, waiting too close to the election to reveal the information will be perceived as either a plant or playing politics with intelligence.
So I think that the truth may never be revealed - at a great cost to history.
By the same measure, if we don't have any information, and no chance of finding Iraqi WMD, we should lay those cards down, too. Either way, Ritter's criticism of the ISG holds:
Given what's known about sarin shells, the US could be expected to offer a careful recital of the data with news of the shell. But facts that should have accompanied the story - the type of shell, its condition, whether it had been fired previously, and the age and viability of the sarin and precursor chemicals - were absent. And that's opened the door to irresponsible speculation that the shell was part of a live WMD stockpile. The data - available to the ISG - would put this development in proper perspective - allowing responsible discussion of the event and its possible ramifications.
posted by blaster at 09:28 PM | Comments (0)
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What is UNMOVIC doing?
Well, now I can't stop looking for information on this. UNMOVIC still exists, and it still provides reports to the UN. In it's latest report (PDF), this is what UNMOVIC has to say about the mortars found by the Danes:
5. The Commission has continued to assess material that is in the public domain on the issues pertaining to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and to compare it against what is known by UNMOVIC about Iraq’s various weapons programmes. An example is the discovery by Danish troops of 120-mm mortars in southern Iraq in January, reported in the media as possibly containing a blistering chemical-weapons agent. A statement was later made by the Danish Army to the effect that the laboratory test results on the 120-mm mortars had been negative for the presence of chemical weapons agents. This is consistent with the Commission’s study on Iraq’s non-conventional munitions, as Iraq’s chemical warfare arsenal was not known to include such 120-mm mortars. Iraq is known to have filled mortar shells only with riot control agents and conventional explosives. A summary of what was previously known to the Commission and UNMOVIC findings during inspections with respect to Iraq’s chemical and biological munitions is set out in appendix I to the present report.
So in 2004, UNMOVIC thinks that the Iraqis never had chemical agents in mortars. But we knew they had them back in 1986!:
In addition to bombs, Baghdad has chemical artillery shells for its 82-mm and 120-mm mortars and its 130-mm, 152-mm, and I55-mm guns. Furthermore, Iraq probably has the capability to deliver chemicals with 122-Mm rockets. Mustard agent has been delivered by all of these systems, while tabun has been delivered by aerial bombs only.
posted by blaster at 06:25 PM | Comments (0)
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A recap and the reveal
Finally, I am getting to my "interesting conclusion," but first, a recap of the posts and comments and discoveries therein. First and foremost is the ISG's release that was announced by BG Kimmitt. He announced that an IED had been found using an artillery shell that contained sarin. The round was a true binary projectile (I'll use true binary here for reasons of distinction between this round and the Iraqi unfortunate individual with jerry cans kind, which I'll call "crude binary.")
My first analysis that this must have been made post Gulf War turns out to be wrong. It could have been made pre Gulf War. UNSCOM became aware of the true binary capability in 1995/1996, through the "discovery" of the Haidar Farm documents - the ones found in a chicken coop. Scott Ritter claims that the Iraqis produced exactly 170 of these rounds, and some 20 were never filled with sarin precursors but with other liquids for testing, and 150 were fired downrange for testing with sarin precursors, providing a possible - in his words, "very likely," event for the source of this round - a dud from the test firings. UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC were unconvinced that the Iraqis never produced more of these rounds. They did not have sufficient documentation to validate that.
So this round could be from the 1980s, but BG Kimmitt did not say that. In order for it to be from a previously declared source, it has to be a dud that was actually fired.
It should be very easy for the ISG to determine if the round was fired or not - Ritter suggests the condition of the base bleed charge, and also there should be a rotating band on the projectile that would be grooved if the round was fired. This evidence will still exist even though there was some sort of detonation of the IED, either a controlled explosion conducted by EOD or whether it went off on its own by timer or command detonation. It won't take weeks in a CSI lab, simple visual inspection would provide the answers. So the ISG should already know the answer.
I think the ISG must know the answer. And just like the press which is amazingly incurious about this round, the ISG, the CPA, and the administration are amazingly quiet about it.
And here's the interesting conclusion - rather than the threat of WMD in Iraq having been hyped, I think that the threat has been downplayed. It has been downplayed systematically by all parties, and for a long time. First, UNSCOM was aware of this true binary capability in Iraq in 1996, and glossed over it in its reports, and in publications after that, continued to rely on the "crude binary" story as a way to prove that Iraq's sarin capability was minimal, and had been stopped by the inspection regime. Ritter, who detailed the true binary capability in his op-ed, was using the crude binary story to riducule those who thought that Iraq could maintain a chemical capability over time in 2000 - well after he knew about the true binary capability.
Meanwhile, the US DoD published a document in 1998 that noted that the Iraqis were limited to a crude binary capability - that document is the source of the "unfortunate individual" description. There have been a series of seemingly incontrovertible pieces of evidence of Iraqi WMD that turned out to be controvertible instead. The mortar rounds found by the Danes that tested postive for mustard in the field and in the lab, and then were declared non-hazardous by testing at the Idaho National Energy Laboratory are very curious. From the photos I saw, I would have determined them to be mustard filled mortars even without testing. So what non-hazardous liquid was put in these mortars? It certainly wasn't pesticide, which is what the ISG said the poisons stored in camouflage bunkers in Karbala were (Go ahead and read that whole article).
But the downplayng of Iraqi WMD capability goes back further than that. In this post I relate how soldiers were told to change reports of chemical attacks in Iraq during the Gulf War. The interesting conclusion I reach in that post (that Iraq had attacked the US with WMD twice, and that we had failed to retaliate made Iraq dangerous) may be out there, a bit, but the facts leading up to it are well documented.
And now the special sauce - something less well documented. Something told to me by someone who has worked with the ISG - but I won't provide any additional information that would make this more credible because I wouldn't want the person's identity revealed. This person told me that the CIA had deliberately removed information from ISG reports that revealed discoveries of WMD materials in Iraq. This fits in the vein of the fact that Pentagon officials thought the sarin shell IED was classified information, and also with the instructions to soldiers to change their reports from the Gulf War, and with the "this didn't happen" when the agency guy took the sarin round from one of my soldiers.
There is some larger game afoot, and I don't know what it is. I can imagine circumstances where it would be more important to conceal this kind of information than to reveal it, and even imagine circumstances where it might be preferable but not important. But I think in this case, at this time, the truth is the most important. Let's start with this round we know about right now. The ISG knows the answers. Let's hear them.
posted by blaster at 04:50 PM | Comments (5)
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What I think
That's what blogging is all about, right? All this about the sarin round, and I have yet to say what I think. Well, now it can be told. Obviously I don't think this was a remnant of the Iran-Iraq war, though just as obviously, I know it is possible for dud chemical rounds from that era to exist in Iraq. I think this round was from a production run of binary chemical shells in Iraq and undisclosed to the UN inspection teams. This could have been prior to 1990, but I think it may have been done after the inspectors left in 1998. The shells, unmarked as chemical, are stored with other conventional artillery shells, though I don't think it is one round packed in a pallet of other rounds, more likely it is a pallet or more stored with other pallets. In short, I think there are more.
But that's just what I think - the ISG probably knows. So the question is, will the truth be revealed? More to the point, will the truth be sought?
posted by blaster at 03:15 PM | Comments (0)
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Are these Ritter's rounds?
Digging deeper into the UNSCOM reports (you can find them all here), I found one reference that could be the rounds that Ritter writes about in his op-ed. The reference is in this report from 1997.
65. In the period from 1988 to 1990, Iraq carried out several projects on types of chemical warfare munitions of which it has not provided physical evidence. This includes binary artillery munitions and aerial bombs, chemical warheads for short-range missiles, cluster aerial bombs and spray tanks. According to Iraq, prototypes of those munitions were produced in limited quantities and only for trials. Without documents to support Iraq's declarations, the Commission is not able to make an assessment of the extent of the projects and their implementation. The Commission has frequently requested documents from Iraq to support its statements. Such documents have not been provided.
Interesting to note that while Ritter seems very confident that Iraq produced 170 of these rounds, and that they were all accounted for in testing - UNSCOM does not arrive at this conclusion. UNSCOM states directly that there is not sufficient documentation.
MORE: An UNMOVIC document (PDF) verifies that this type of binary round was tested in Iraq in 1989:
Iraq has declared that it carried out experiments on true binary weapons systems using artillery shells and rockets between 1983 and 1990. These binary weapons systems involved the precursors MPF and alcohol being kept separate in the munition. The physical forces associated with the firing of the weapon cause the precursors to mix and react with one another during flight. This work was carried out at Muthana State Establishment (MSE) and the Technical Research Centre (TRC). Iraq further declared that, while in 1989 and 1990 it had obtained some encouraging results, they were not reliable enough to warrant a move to the production stage. Iraq has provided documentary evidence that details the successful testing of a binary munition for Sarin in 1989, in a report of the TRC “On the progress of research into Binary Chemical Weapons”, in conjunction with MSE. Further information about Iraq’s work on a binary weapon for Sarin was obtained from documents from the Haidar farm, and from interviews carried out with Iraqi personnel.
The UNMOVIC report is also unsure of whether the R&D rounds are the extent of production:
In the absence of further documentation, it cannot be ascertained whether Iraq developed its true binary weapons system for Sarin into large-scale production of binary artillery shells and rockets. To help resolve this issue, Iraq should identify all facilities (in addition to MSE and TRC) that had been involved in production/modification of artillery shells and rockets as true binary weapons. In addition, Iraq should also provide clarification of all details concerning its design for binary weapons systems.
Note that this report is from March, 2003.
posted by blaster at 10:36 AM | Comments (0)
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A US shell?
There are people out there who are suggesting - no, they are outright claiming - that the sarin round is a US round. They say it is a US M687, which is the only binary chemical round that the US put in production. We made them in the late 1980s, so it was a recent development for the US, and represents a pretty sophisticated technology. It functions in a manner that is consistent with the round that BG Kimmitt described in the press conference - 2 cells of precursor materials that mix when the round is fired, creating sarin.
The people who believe that "of course Saddam had chemical weapons, Rumsfeld gave them to him" or "wow, a chemical weapon found right after Rumsfeld visited, how convenient," are sure that this round is a US M687. They also often point to the shell being a 155mm instead of the 152mm of a Soviet round to bolster the claim. This neglects, of course, that the Iraqis used the G-5 howitzer, purchased from South Africa, which is a 155mm gun, and that in the UNSCOM reports they detail the possession of 155mm chemical rounds. The G-5 was designed by Gerald Bull, who developed the base bleed concept, and who was later in the employ of the Iraqis for weapon design. The rounds that Scott Ritter writes about are meant for firing from that gun.
If the round that was used in the IED was base bleed (and that is likely given the Iraqi G-5 howitzers), then it isn't an M687, because the M687 isn't a base bleed projectile. The US doesn't use base bleed that much because while it does increase range, it negatively affects accuracy.
posted by blaster at 07:58 AM | Comments (3)
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Quickly
Have to catch a train shortly, and will be out of touch with the net for a little. (Note to Amtrak - would have paid the extra $50 for Acela if the 80211b was on there!) So just a quick note.
I haven't found anything in the UNSCOM reports to back up what Ritter's article says. Reader AMac in the comments has done some pretty extensive review of the docs and doesn't turn up anything, either. Also, Ritter does not mention any dates of the program, and it is obviously a different program of binary shells than those referred to in the 1996 UNSCOM document of shells excavated at the weapons production facility, since Ritter says all of the ones he is writing about were either non-chemical testers or fired downrange.
Leads to an interesting conclusion that I will take some time on and post later tonight.
Also, the other issue I have - all of these questions are not really mysteries. The answers to all of them are known - they are just not public. Meanwhile, we are wallowing in Abu Ghraib. The administration, the CPA, the ISG - should be out front providing these answers. And since they aren't, the press should be hounding them to find them out.
posted by blaster at 11:10 AM | Comments (0)
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May 21, 2004 |
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Thinking about Ritter's article
Had some time to think while driving today about Ritter's article, and I'm afraid it raises more questions than it answers. If Iraq had this technology, why did UNSCOM never report it, and why did Ritter himself, in 2000, pooh pooh the idea that Iraq had anything like it? From the details that Ritter provides, I know that he knows what he is talking about. Where is the documentation, the supporting proof? Ritter said that he passed information to the United States while with UNSCOM - why did the DoD still report Iraq's crude binary system in 1998?
Another piece that raises some suspicions is when he writes "To the untrained eye, the artillery shell, if found in this state, would look weathered, but unfired." But we know that EOD techs were on site. They are not untrained eyes. They probably know whether that is a fired or unfired round, and it doesn't require forensic analysis.
Then there is this - if what Ritter writes about the existence of the rounds is true, then both Blix and Kay know for a fact that these are not leftovers from the Iran-Iraq war. The rounds Ritter describes are part of a development program, not deployed systems. Why are they saying that this is "probably" a leftover from then?
It also doesn't let the LA Times off the hook for deliberately distorting what BG Kimmitt said.
More questions than answers.
posted by blaster at 02:55 PM | Comments (7)
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An answer, and questions - from Scott Ritter?
In the comments, someone points to an article in Christian Science Monitor where Scott Ritter has answered the one question. And the answer is...YES. This type of binary, mix in flight shell has been recorded in Iraq before. (since noone else has even asked the question he is answering, I have to wonder - is Scott Ritter reading this blog?)
The key to whether the sarin artillery round came from an arms cache or was a derelict dud rests in the physical characteristics of the shell. The artillery shells in question were fitted with two aluminum cannisters separated by a rupture disk. The two precursor chemicals for the kind of sarin associated with this shell were stored separately in these containers. The thrust of the shell being fired was designed to cause the liquid in the forward cannister to press back and break the rupture disk, whereupon the rotation of the shell as it headed downrange would mix the two precursors together, creating sarin. Upon impact with the ground - or in the air, if a timed fuse was used - a burster charge would break the shell, releasing the sarin gas.
Many things go wrong when firing an artillery round: the propellent charge can be faulty, resulting in a round that
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