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Everybody loves a winner
In one of my International Relations classes many years ago, we did an exercise where we played a model of nuclear disarmament negotiation. I guess that dates me a bit. In the mid-80's, disarmament was all the rage. We were even talking about it at West Point.
As I recall, the model that we played was something that the actual negotiators did for practice (one of the advantages of the Military Academy, I guess). The rules went like this. Each side got 100 points to assign to various weapon systems, and then the other side got to take away 10 points worth. (I don't remember the details exactly - it could have been more, like 20 or 25.) The basis of the game is like ensuring fairness when cutting a piece of cake in two - one person cuts, the other person chooses. I think we did it for 4 rounds, and the results of each round were fed into a computer (not sure if it was PC or mainframe based at the time) and each move was scored for its effect on the "stability" of the system. We knew generally what factors were said to comprise stability - essentially if one side had something that the other side couldn't readily counter or account for - i.e., if you had something that you could defeat the other side with - then that made things less stable. On the US side of things, the MX missile system and our sub-based systems made things less stable.
That seemed silly to me, trying to negotiate to "parity." I believe in MacArthur's dictum that there is "no subsitute for victory." Our first move kept things in the stable territory, and the guys playing the Soviets did the same thing. But I looked at how they had "priced" their systems, and I saw how we could win - we could take several thousand of their weapons in exchange for getting about 100 or so of our oldest and least reliable systems off the table, while keeping our most modern systems. It took some convincing, but we decided to do what I suggested. It worked as I had predicted, we improved the reliability of the US stockpile, and we got rid of a sizable percentage of the Soviet arsenal in one move. Win-win, in my book. But the computer hated it. We took a nosedive out of the "stable zone," into a danger zone, with that one move.
Well, my team got nervous with that - they wanted to be where the model wanted us to be. So even though I argued that we could essentially halve the Soviet arsenal at little cost to our own, we ended up splitting the difference between my path toward victory and what the demands of stability were. So the next round, we still depleted the Soviets more than us, but we lost what to me were critical assets that we did not have to lose. And the score crept back toward the stability zone, but we were still in "danger." The last round, my team ended up sacrificing to the god of stability, putting the modern systems up cheap, practically giving them away (the equivalent of unilateral disarmament) so that the model thought we were winning. It worked, and we just barely got into the zone. That was the damage my one really good stroke had done to our position.
That bothered me that we were training our negotiators to work not for victory, but for a tie. The assumption was that if there wasn't a tie on the nuclear front, that the side that had the least assurance of being in a tie - i.e., the losers - were going to go ahead and strike first, so even if we had "won" the battle of disarmament, we all lost in the end. A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.
What made me think of this was a Sally Quinn piece in the Washington Post about Ahmed Chalabi. As happens often in the Post, an article that seems actually insightful about Iraq ends up in the Style section. What struck me was the opening paragraph:
He smiles a knowing smile. He's got this baby in the bag. But then, he always does. That's what makes his detractors crazy -- and his supporters so loyal. Never, they say, underestimate Ahmed Chalabi. It is always a mistake.
Ms. Quinn has wrapped up the core of our supercharged political atmosphere, not just Ahmed Chalabi. Success makes detractors crazy, and supporters loyal. I wrote a few weeks ago about a David Broder column where he praised Bob Michel, the former Republican Minority Leader in the House. Of course Democrats liked him - he was a force for "stability" - permanent rule of the House by Democrats - rather than for victory. Newt Gingrich, on the other hand, was about winning, and he did. And he was reviled, and loved for it. President Clinton engendered that same kind of love and hate. Why were his supporters so loyal, his detractors so crazed? Because, agree with him or not, he was successful at achieving his goals. Senator Jesse Helms wasn't just "Senator No," he was Senator "No, not if you don't do it my way." On the flip side, President George H. W. Bush lost on the "no new taxes" pledge, and tried to accomodate the Democrats. He was opposed, not reviled. But he lost.
Generally, I think, the polarizing figures in politics are those that are successful at doing what they aim to do. And that is why we see such division over this President Bush. He has been succeeding in achieving his goals, in this country, with or without Democrats, in the world, with or without the support of France. This drives his opponents crazy, and it makes his supporters loyal.
As pittspilot notes below, the trip to Baghdad was part political theater, and people want it. But people criticize it because it was a sign of victory. And in that, I think we should take heart. Yes, it is disgusting to read what some are saying about it, but the point of it was not to win over the Angry Left, but to boost the morale of the troops and demonstrate American resolve and power. And with those things, we will win.
posted by blaster at 08:33 PM | Comments (0)
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